

THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLITICAL DECISION TOWARDS THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGIONAL REGION

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Abstract:

Our contemporary reality has witnessed many local changes in several countries, and these changes did not make their previous reality the same as what follows it. The political positions of the country did not remain the same before the occurrence of these leadership changes. For the criteria of true democracy, a quick comparison of the reality of democratic and other countries, we find that in the first, the positions drawn for foreign policy remain as they are without real change, even if they leave some influences on the mechanisms of their expression. A different reality, especially when exposed to the leadership variable, and drawing the features of a new political stage in it, all of this undoubtedly leaves a great impact on the positions formulated by the competent bodies in their international relations, so that they are almost a realistic translation of the desires of that variable. And since the study is about the leadership variable of the Egyptian states, specifically after the revolution of June 30-2013 and the advent of the new political leadership led by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, there is no doubt that the impact of the latter is clear in the work of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that the degrees of this influence differ according to each entity, issue or crisis. They all have a specific policy.

Keywords: Egypt–Foreign Policy–Turkey–Iran–the Israeli entity

Introduction:

The initiative of regional states of the Arab Republic of Egypt replaced the influences of the leadership variable in it, especially with regard to the periods of the Arab Spring and its appurtenances of changes at the political level.¹ Perhaps countries such as Turkey, Iran and (the Israeli entity) come in the priorities of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry's calculations in dealing with it and managing its political relations with its leaders. That change in Egypt did not take place as desired by the Turkish ships, especially in terms of the ideology that the new Egyptian leadership enjoys over its predecessor, while Iran may have been the absent present in Egyptian foreign policy after the 30-year revolution of 2013, which had its share in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry's ladder of accounts, While the file of the Palestinian cause and the Israeli entity behind it topped the recent accounts through a position that can be described as positive by the Egyptian leadership, which it expressed in the public and secret official meetings between the two parties, "the Egyptian and the Israeli.

The first requirement: Egyptian foreign policy towards the Republic of Türkiye

(1) Ahmed Khamis Kamel, Moving Diplomacy, Features of New Orientations in Egyptian Foreign Policy, International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram Foundation, Egypt, February 2014, pg. 39

Understanding what can be described as the “unprecedented impact” that Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi made on foreign policy towards a regional country like the Republic of Turkey can only be by standing on the short period of time that preceded the era of President El-Sisi, specifically after the January 2011 revolution, and what resulted The protests led to a radical change in the Egyptian leadership, and the advent of a new spirit for Egyptian foreign policy.²⁾

First: Egyptian foreign policy towards Turkey after the January 2011 revolution:

What we care about from this time period to find out the role of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in forming Egyptian foreign policy towards Turkey is the ideological thought in that policy, as the January 25 revolution in Egypt brought about a political and intellectual rapprochement between the political leadership in Egypt and its Turkish counterpart³.

This rapprochement played an important role, especially between the Turkish Justice and Development Party, which has been ruling Turkey for decades, and the dissolved Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party (*)Which was established on June 6 of the year 2011⁴.

Perhaps the most important thing that helped this rapprochement is that both parties have an Islamic reference that some describe as having one source, which is the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. The strength of Egyptian-Turkish relations reached its peak under the rule of the dissolved Egyptian Justice and Development Party. Some even described it as the golden age of Egyptian and Turkish relations. Especially under the rule of the late Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, whose rule included mutual official visits from both sides, all of which resulted in an emphasis on strengthening relations between the two countries? ⁵

The main goal was to increase the volume of cooperation between them, and among those visits, remember the visit of the Egyptian Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at the time, "Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi," who headed a high-level military delegation after a request from his Turkish counterpart, to consolidate aspects of cooperation and strengthen military relations between the armed forces. for both countries in many fields, and President Sisi participated at the time in the opening of the Istanbul International Arms Exhibition ⁶ Without knowing at the time that the visit of this minister will result later in the transformation of relations between the two countries from cooperation and friendship to enmity that may not have been experienced in the history of these relations before.

Second: Egyptian foreign policy towards Türkiye after the June 2013 revolution:

What is known as the second Egyptian revolution "June 2013" caused a paradox in the history of Egyptian-Turkish relations, as the former President Mohamed Morsi was deposed, and this was followed by a series of measures and decisions that brought about a fundamental change in the

(2) Mishaal Muhammad Al-Sarhan, The Impact of Regional Variables on Egyptian-Turkish Relations, 2011-2017, Master Thesis, Al al-Bayt University, Jordan, 2019, p. 15

(3) Abdullah Ahmed Al-Sayed and Shorouq Ahmed Issa, The Egyptian-Turkish Rapprochement and its Repercussions on Regional Issues, Al-Afaq Al-Siyasiyya Journal, The Arab Center for Research and Studies, Issue 69, February 2021, p. 58

(3)Nabil Ezz El-Din Jamil, The Impact of Revolutionary Transformations on Foreign Policy towards Egypt 2011_2015, Journal of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Volume 17, Issue 1, 2016, p. 148.

(5) Ahmed Muhammad Abu Zaid, Determinants of Egyptian Foreign Policy after the January 25 Revolution, The Arab Future, Issue 391, Volume 34, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2011, p. 130.

(6) Ibtihal Salah Al-Sayed Abu Al-Rajal, Egyptian-Turkish Relations After the January 2011 Revolution, The Scientific Journal of Commercial and Environmental Studies, Volume 11, Number Two, Faculty of Commerce in Ismailia, Suez Canal University, 2020, p. 2.

Egyptian scene, whether on the internal or external level, and among this change The Egyptian foreign policy is the direction of yesterday's relative, the "Republic of Turkey", in which President Sisi had the most prominent role in changing this policy ⁷.

Turkey described, in the words of its foreign minister at the time, "Recep Tayyip Erdogan," that a military coup led by President Al-Sisi, Minister of Defense during the era of the late Egyptian President "Mohamed Morsi," against legitimacy represented by the overthrow of a president elected by the Egyptian people) ⁽⁸⁾Which made the former minister and the current president of Egypt, "President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, diverting Egyptian foreign policy towards Turkey in several respects. Accusations were leveled against the Turkish ambassador at the time and he was asked to leave, and diplomatic representation with Turkey was reduced to the level of charge d'affaires, and Ankara was accused of meddling in Egypt's affairs. The Ministry of Interior and the attempt to turn the international community against its interests, and express its intention to recognize the Armenian massacre, "the nightmare that has haunted Ankara for several years." Egypt has also received many Turkish opposition leaders within the framework of closer relations with Turkish political forces, such as the leaders of the opposition Republican People's Party and the PKK, and the well-known With their strong opposition to the ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party, in which the latter forces emphasized that the vision of the Turkish Justice and Development Party does not reflect the Turkish people's vision of what happened in Egypt in terms of change ⁹.

The divergent Egyptian-Turkish positions regarding the crises in the region are one of the lines that President Sisi drew for the Egyptian Foreign Ministry towards Turkey. For example, the position on the Syrian crisis. It can be said that the recent crisis constituted one of the arenas of political dispute between the two parties ¹⁰

As Egypt has maintained, since the advent of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, a firm stance towards the Syrian issue based on non-interference in the internal affairs of Syria and an emphasis on resolving the crisis according to the political track. , which is a position that is completely compatible with the Turkish position, but that the latter may have gone further by interfering directly in the Syrian war on the side of the Syrian armed opposition against the Syrian regime ¹¹. The Gaza issue also constituted another arena for drawing Egyptian foreign policy by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi towards Turkey through the nature of the relationship with the Palestinian Islamic movements in Gaza, led by Hamas, and Egypt's accusation of the latter threatening its national security by interfering in its internal affairs, while the movement's relations were Hamas with the Turkish side in its development ¹².

(7) Shaima Marouf Farhan, Turkish-Egyptian Relations After 2011, Political Attitudes Magazine, Issue Ten, Volume Three, March 2020, Arab Democratic Center, Berlin - Germany, 2020, p. 20

(8) Estefania Maher Naim Rizk, Turkish foreign policy towards Islamic organizations, a case study of ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Arab Democratic Center, Berlin, Germany, 2016. Available on the website: <https://democraticac.de/?p=34914>

(9) Egypt expels the Turkish ambassador from Cairo, and Ankara reciprocates: France 24, published on 11/23/2013: on the website: Date of visit: <https://www.france24.com/ar>

10 Khaled Salman Khaled, Turkish and Egyptian Relations After the Events of Arab Change and Their Future Prospects, Journal of Political Issues, Issue 61, Year Twelve, College of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University, 2020, p. 321

11 Saeedi Al-Said, Turkey's foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party and its repercussions on Turkish-Arab relations, a published master's thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Mohamed Khedira University, Biskra, 2014, pg. 30

12 Mazen Khalil Ibrahim, Political Changes in Turkish (Israeli) Relations for the Period (2002-2013) and Their

Egyptian foreign policy witnessed a confrontation with Turkey after its position opposing the second Egyptian revolution "June 2013" by seeking to settle the Libyan crisis, in which Turkey takes a position different from the Egyptian position there, especially after President Sisi's decision to launch a military air strike against the targets of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. ISIS" in the city of Derna, eastern Libya, in February 2015, which received support from the internationally recognized Libyan government ¹³.

With the same approach, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry sought to strengthen its relations with partners that have tense relations with Ankara, especially in the Mediterranean region, such as Greece and Cyprus, which had a significant impact on increasing tension in relations between Egypt and Turkey, especially after what happened between Egypt, Cyprus and Greece. At the level of the three foreign ministers on the sidelines of the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly between 2013 and 2014 and then Nicosia, in which support for the Cyprus issue was emphasized in accordance with United Nations resolutions, combating terrorism and determination to explore oil and gas in the Mediterranean region in accordance with international law and covenants. ⁽¹⁴⁾.

As for On the economic level, in April 2015, Egypt imposed preventive duties on its imports of Turkish iron, and announced its intention not to renew the Ro-Ro agreement*, for maritime transport, which was activated in April 2012 for a period of three years ending in April 2015, imposing temporary anti-dumping duties on reinforcing steel imports from Turkey at a rate ranging from 10% to 19% for a period of 4 months and final anti-dumping duties on steel imported from Turkey for a period of December 2017, also from The UAE relations, which indicate what the Egyptian president has planned in the Egyptian foreign policy towards Turkey, is the delay in issuing a UN statement after the failed coup in Turkey in July 2016 calling on all parties to adhere to restraint and calling for an end to the crisis and a return to the rule of law and respect for the democratically elected government in Turkey. ¹⁵

Third: The evolution of the Egyptian foreign policy strategy towards Turkey after the June/January 2013 revolution:

Despite the deterioration of relations at the political level, economic relations still represent the main pillar of cooperation between the two countries, and this is reflected in the volume of trade exchange between the two countries, as the end of 2020 witnessed the end of the free trade agreement between the two countries signed in 2005 AD ¹⁶Therefore, researchers believe that President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi realizes that, according to some, economic relations constitute hope for re-connection between Egypt and Turkey.¹⁷

Impact on the Palestinian Cause, Political and International Journal, Issue 24, 2014, p. 273

13 Abdel Ghaffar Abdel Rahman Abdel Ghaffar, The Regional Role of Turkey in the Middle East, 2011-2014, Master Thesis / College of Economics and Political Science, 2018, p. 45

14Jad Mustafa Al-Bustani, Turkish intervention in Libya and its impact on Egyptian national security: Afaq Seyasiya Journal, Issue 57, Arab Center for Research and Studies, Egypt, 2020, p. 58

*Ro-Ro Agreement: It is an agreement for the passage of Turkish ferries in the Suez Canal, and it is an agreement signed by Egypt and Turkey to facilitate the transfer of exports. To the Gulf countries, the RORO agreement, knowledge, on the following site www.marefa.org

15 Khaled Hanafi Ali, Turkey Crisis Industry, International Policy Journal, Issue 209, (Al-Ahram Center, Cairo) 2020, p. 40

16Ijlal Ratib, Turkish Economic Relations, Focusing on the Free Trade Agreement, Series of Planning and Development Issues: Institute of National Planning, Cairo: 2015, p. 18

(17) Amira Ismail Mohamed Al-Obeidi, Egyptian-Turkish Relations during the Era of President Al-Sisi (2013-2019), Lark Journal of Philosophy, Linguistics and Social Sciences, Issue 35, October 2010, p. 59

This sparked talk about the possibility of renewing the agreement regardless of the political factors of disagreement, and the agreement awaits renegotiation in order to renew it, which could create spaces for negotiation between the two countries and pave the way for raising the level of diplomatic representation as an initial step to expand the circles of dialogue on outstanding issues, foremost of which is the Libyan file; The matter that President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was keen on, especially not to open fronts for the conflict at the same time and to devote himself to the file of the Renaissance Dam, and with regard to the increasing tension between the two countries, which could be reflected in Egypt's foreign policy towards some countries regarding the outstanding issues, and by returning to the Libyan crisis and the presence of Turkey as a party An actor in the Libyan file. Reaching understandings with Turkey has become a topic within the Egyptian agenda to support a political solution and a peaceful settlement, and to ensure that Libya does not turn into an arena of conflict between international powers and Islamic groups, as happened in Syria, which reflects positively on Egyptian national security, and by addressing the Egyptian opposition file, it represents¹⁸

In terms of the crisis in the eastern Mediterranean and the inability of some countries to fully exploit their resources as a result of the dispute over the maritime borders, reaching collective agreements in light of the rapprochement will reflect positively on the stability of the region and the ability of countries to achieve optimal utilization of their resources.¹⁹

Of all the aforementioned factors of Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement, the latter may have formed the structure that President Sisi planned for a new phase of Turkish-Egyptian relations, and this is indeed what the Egyptian Foreign Ministry translated in its political and diplomatic discourse towards Ankara, especially after the statements of Turkish President "Recep Tayyip Erdogan" about not His opposition to high-level contacts and meetings with Egypt, the Turkish government's restriction of some media channels opposing the political system in Egypt, and the rate of trade exchange between the two countries jumped in 2021 by a third, with a value of up to (1.6) billion dollars additional to the volume of exchanges that reached (11.14) billion dollars, according to official statistics)²⁰

Indeed, the Egyptian diplomatic moves pushed undoubtedly by the supreme leadership represented by the person of President Sisi resulted in holding diplomatic meetings with the Turkish side, which concluded with the meeting between the presidents of the two countries, "Erdogan and Sisi" in the Qatari capital, "Doha", which constituted the first seeds of cooperation between the two countries on many issues. Which concern the two countries, including the Turkish-Greek crisis, as President Al-Sisi, a few hours after meeting Erdogan, instructed his Foreign Minister, "Sameh Shoukry," to meet with Minister Nikos Dendibas, in a clear reference to President Al-Sisi's emphasis on Egypt's role in resolving the Turkish-Greek crisis, despite the tireless Egyptian assertion On more than one occasion, this Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement will not be at the expense of Greece and Cyprus, especially in light of Turkey's non-recognition of Cyprus, or the demarcation of the Egyptian-

(18) Jaber Omar, Behind the scenes of Egyptian-Turkish communications to restore official relations, Al-Aman Magazine: Issue 1508, Beirut, 2022, available on the website: Date of visit: <https://al-aman.com/>
19Yad Nassar and Suhad Al-Raba'a, The Role of Foreign Policy in Improving Turkish Relations with Egypt (2014-2021) and the Future of Joint Cooperation, Journal of the Islamic University for Economic and Administrative Studies, Volume 30, Issue 3, Al-Aqsa University, Palestine, 2022, p. 56

20Dalia Al-Ajmi, Turkish-Egyptian Rapprochement from the Perspective of Mutual Interests, Egyptian Institute for Studies, Ankara, 2021, p. 34

Greek borders.²¹

The second requirement: Egyptian foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi was an influential factor in Egyptian foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, and this can be understood from the Iranian positions on the political regimes that successively ruled Egypt in recent years, and the foreign policy that each of them had towards Iran and its policies in the region ²².

Under the regime of former President Hosni Mubarak, who was distinguished for his long rule, the Egyptian-Iranian relations were characterized by fluctuation and tension, especially with Egypt's support for Iraq during its war against Iran, which lasted for eight years (1980-1988), as well as the position on the Palestinian issue, as Iran is the military supporter of the factions The Palestinian resistance, Egypt was calling for peaceful solutions to the Palestinian cause, which constituted a factor in a political dispute between Egypt and Iran in approaching the situation in Palestine. To the above, tension factors were added related to the Egyptian security services' disclosure of thwarting an Iranian plan to plant an Egyptian spy, in cooperation with an Iranian diplomat. In Egypt in 2004, which Iran denied completely²³

The Egyptian-Iranian relations remained as they were of tension and fluctuation until the advent of the Arab Spring revolutions and the change that occurred in the Egyptian political system and the advent of the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood after the revolution of January 2012 ²⁴

There was a warm Iranian welcome from the highest levels, when Mr. Khamenei praised the youth revolution in Egypt in a sermon he delivered in February 2011, in which he emphasized that this revolution is a product of the Iranian Islamic revolution, and that the regime of President Hosni Mubarak is an agent regime that stood beside the entity. The Israeli) in its war against Gaza, directing calls to the Egyptian army to stand by the Egyptian people, and that the West and America are not trustworthy, and that the Egyptian army should look for new faces to lead Egypt ²⁵.

The former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami also called on the Egyptians to continue their demonstrations. At the same time, the Iranian President at the time, "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad," asserted that Egypt's revolution was a product of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and that what is happening in the Arab world is a global revolution led by the nations of the Mahdi, and that it is a huge awakening that is taking place. Imam Mahdi can be seen in it²⁶.

And at this stage of the Egyptian-Iranian relations, the rapprochement between the two countries began, and it was stronger than the Iranian side. Former Iranian President Ahmadinejad for attending the Non-Aligned Summit held in Tehran, to which President Morsi responded, and it represented the first visit of an Egyptian president to Iran after 1979, and a glimmer of hope among some for the return of Egyptian-Iranian relations after a break that lasted for more than three

²¹A New Political Path Between Egypt and Turkey After the Sisi-Erdogan Meeting, Al-Sharaf Al-Awsat Newspaper, <https://aawsat.com/home/article>

²²Sarah Bad Al-Hamid Ibrahim Al-Deeb, Egyptian-Iranian Relations after the January 2011 Revolution, Al-Istiqlal Magazine, Issue 8, Al-Istiqlal Center for Strategic Studies and Consultations, 2017, p. 66

(23) Essam Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad Ayoub, The Impact of Changing the International System and the Development of Regional Issues on Egyptian-Iranian Relations, 1989-2009, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 2012, p. 135

(24) Muhammad Al-Shugairat, The Role of Iranian Foreign Policy towards Arab Issues, an unpublished master's thesis, College of Graduate Studies, University of Islamic Sciences, Palestine, 2013, p. 22

²⁵Ashraaq Ahmad Arafat Muhammad, Egyptian-Iranian Relations (2011, 2016), Arab Democratic Center, Berlin, Germany, 2016. Posted on the website: Date of visit <https://democraticac.de/?p=35024>

(26) Hani Raslan, The International and Arab Position on the Revolution of January 25, 2011, Website: Date of Visit <https://sudanile.com/>

decades.

Morsi's visit was followed by many official visits between the two countries, including the visit of then Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi to Cairo in 2012 to attend the quartet initiative to solve the Syrian crisis, followed by the holding of the Egyptian Economic Forum in Iran, in which Egypt participated with a number of businessmen, which resulted in The signing of the first protocol between the two countries since the severance of diplomatic relations, which included the resumption of flights between the two countries ²⁷

Then came the visit of former Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Egypt in 2014 as the first visit of an Iranian president after thirty-four years of estrangement, with the aim of participating in the work of the Islamic Summit in Egypt, during which he met with former President Morsi and Sheikh Al-Azhar ²⁸.

the foregoing, Iranian-Egyptian relations can be described as good, at least under the former Egyptian regime, but the June 2013 revolution and the advent of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi had a different opinion and a different strategy, and clear political lines touched by the new president of Egypt towards Iran ²⁹.

With the outbreak of the recent revolution in Egypt, and the removal of President Morsi, the Iranian Foreign Ministry took a position opposing the recent events when it opposed the Egyptian army's intervention in politics to overthrow a democratically elected president. Non-escalation in its disputes with the new Egyptian regime after the June 30 revolution, through several things, the first of which is the Iranian presence at the level of the Iranian Assistant Foreign Minister in Arab and African Affairs, Hussein Amir Abdollahian, at the inauguration ceremony of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and his taking the constitutional oath, and the second is Iran's cancellation of entry visas to its lands For citizens of seven countries, including Egypt ³⁰.

Despite all these Iranian attempts to mend the rift in Egyptian-Iranian relations, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's role in making Egyptian foreign policy towards Iran appears clear in setting limits for these relations ³¹.

The first of them begins with the strong relationship between Egypt and some Arab Gulf countries, which have not good relations with neighboring Iran, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Iran passes through the Arabian Gulf, and that the security of Egypt is inseparable from the security of the Gulf," which was translated with the field events, including the burning of the Saudi embassy in Iran, the Saudi announcement of severing its diplomatic relations with Iran, and the Egyptian position that condemned the incident, as well as the Egyptian position in support of the issue of the three Emirati islands occupied by Iran³².

27Muhammad Ahmad Al-Miqdad, *The Impact of Internal and External Changes on Iran's Regional Orientations, Iranian-Arab Relations, Case Study, Humanities and Social Sciences Studies*, Volume 40, Number 2, University of Jordan, Amman 2013, p. 446

(28) Ahmed Hussein, *Iranian-Egyptian Relations During the Period 2010-2020*, Al-Masar for Human Studies, 2020, pg. 7

(29) Moataz Muhammad Salameh, *Egyptian policy towards Iran and the challenges of moving from estrangement to normalization*, *Journal of Iranian Studies*, Volume One, Issue Four, Arabian Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, 2017, p. 45.

(30) Shaima al-Hawari, *Iranian-Arab Relations Between What It Is: Political, Security, and Sectarian*, *Iranian Orbits Magazine*, Issue 1, Arab Democratic Center, Berlin, Germany, 2018, p. 103.

(31) Saif Obaidullah Ibrahim Al-Mawajda, *The Impact of Local, Regional, and International Variables on Egyptian-Iranian Relations, 2011-2016*, *Academic Journal for Legal and Political Research*, Volume Five, Issue One, 2021, p. 331.

32Shaima al-Hawari, *Iranian-Arab Relations Between What: Political, Security, and Sectarian*, a previously published work, 786

As for the second of these limits to the Egyptian foreign policy towards Iran, it can be found in the political stances regarding some files, for example the Syrian crisis. Security, we must all take a clear and decisive stance towards these interventions, sending a categorical message that we will not allow any force whatsoever to interfere in our affairs, and that all nine attempts for sectarian or doctrinal hegemony, or the imposition of spheres of influence within the lands of Arab countries, will be met with a unified and strict Arab position³³.

Among these files is also the Iranian nuclear file. Egypt has confirmed on more than one occasion its clear position on this issue, which it has always crystallized in the context of the Egyptian desire to free the Middle East from nuclear weapons and the accession of all countries in the region to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The hotness of the Gulf security files in defining the frameworks of Egyptian foreign policy towards Iran³⁴.

Finally, the danger of Iranian expansion and the Egyptian position warning against it comes within the determinants of Egyptian foreign policy towards Iran, even if this position is as old as the Egyptian-Iranian relations, and that the intensity of the Egyptian position on it under the rule of President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi is less severe than the position of its predecessor, but it remains within the political perceptions. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry, extending the Iranian role in areas where it has popular or sectarian support falls within the calculations of the Egyptian decision-maker, based on the Egyptian vision expressed by President Sisi that it has a pivotal regional role and that it has a moderate Islamic approach that advocates stability and the status quo and confronting terrorist forces and political Islam. Extremism, unlike Iran and its radical approach that seeks to disturb the status quo, according to the expression of the Egyptian vision³⁵.

The third requirement: Egyptian foreign policy towards the Israeli entity

Since the Egyptian army entered political life and overthrew former President Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, during which his presidency witnessed a cooling in Israeli-Egyptian relations, especially after sending Prime Minister Hisham Qandil to the Gaza Strip during the Israeli operation "Pillar of Defense" in November 2012 and attempts at rapprochement with Iran. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the era of President Al-Sisi adopted a different approach, as Al-Sisi's government changed the dynamic that was in the era of President Morsi significantly. As Al-Sisi regained the monopoly on making foreign policy, and determining the directions of international relations, just as things were before the outbreak of the January 2011 revolution⁽³⁶⁾.

Perhaps that capacity in the circle of legitimacy of Sisi's unilateralism is due to the credit of this leader, as some describe him, in isolating Morsi and getting rid of an era of rule by the Muslim Brotherhood³⁷.

mentioned source, p. 120.

³³ on the occasion of his recent visit to the Arab Summit held in Jordan, 2017, on the following website <https://ar.timesofisrael.com>

³⁴Dhafer Al-Ajmi: Egypt and the security of the Arab Gulf, an article published on the Al-Ahram Center for Studies, Politics and Strategy, on the website, the date of the visit 2/2/2023, <https://acpss.ahram.org>

⁽³⁵⁾ Tayel Yuif Abdullah Adwan: The regional strategy of Turkey and Iran towards the Middle East 02002_2013, Master's thesis, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Middle Honor University, 2013, p. 5.

⁽³⁶⁾ Fatima Taha Shamayleh, Egyptian-Israeli Relations for the Period from 1978-2012, unpublished master's thesis, Mu'tah University, Jordan, 2012, p. 61

⁽³⁷⁾ Saleh Al-Naami, Egyptian-Israeli Relations after the January 25 Revolution, Arab House for Science Publishers, Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, Doha, Qatar, 2017, 71

the shaky legitimacy, at least internationally, of the ruling regime in Egypt after the second wave of protests, "the July 2013 revolution," led to the restriction of Egyptian foreign policy due to the clear damage to the status of the international system, which prompted President Sisi to search for an international or regional party to help him get rid of this problem. The international embarrassment in reaching power and the consequences of this access, was accepted by the strengthening of Israeli-Egyptian relations, especially with Sisi's realization of the size of the influence that Israel has in influencing the United States of America, which is the strongest influence in obtaining a position for the new Egyptian regime in international circles³⁸

Indeed, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi did not delay, from the first moments of his rule, in communicating with former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and requesting the use of his influence in the United States to secure American recognition of his rule. The motivation of the iron regime to cooperate with it on the security and intelligence level in confronting the Islamic movements, foremost of which is the Palestinian resistance, and defining Hamas as the common enemy of President Sisi and Israel.³⁹

President El-Sisi was not disappointed in Israel's response to his request. Cooperation with him came quickly, starting with securing international legitimacy, working to resume US military aid to Egypt, and Israeli demands to amend the US law that prohibits providing support to a government that overthrew an elected regime.⁴⁰

The Israeli efforts to secure legitimacy for the new regime in Egypt can be described as "successful." Israel, through its decision-making circles, reduced the frequency of the international media uproar that followed the political transition in Egypt in July 2013 and the consequent removal of the Egyptian president and the takeover of the military council. It has the reins of government, and among those departments is the Jerusalem Center for the Study of Society and the State, which prepared about 15 studies on ways to support President Sisi, with constant and continuous warnings by Israeli elites to the American administration of the consequences of responding to demands to reconsider with the regime in Egypt, for what constitutes This is a very serious threat to Israeli national security, and the search for mechanisms that must support the Sisi regime and ensure its success and stability.⁴¹

The above-mentioned Israeli support for President Al-Sisi may provide support for his regime through channels, which he knows provide continuity in his rule and consolidation, including the United States channel, which made him very keen to control his regional, international and internal behavior in a way that allows the realization of his interest with Israel. And the formation of a new strategy adopted by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards this regional neighbor⁴²

Among the features of this strategy that indicate the influence of President Sisi in it:

First: Enhancing Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation under President El-Sisi:

Security cooperation between Egypt and Israel during the Sisi era constitutes one of the most important manifestations of the shift in this relationship, especially after it reached borders that it

38Muhammad Ali Barakat Al-Alimat, *The Impact of the Arab Spring Revolutions on Israeli Relations 2011-2018*, Faculty of Arts, Jordan, 2020, pg. 76.

(39) Saleh Al-Naami: *Egyptian-Israeli Relations after the January 25 Revolution*, a previously mentioned source, p. 72.

(40) Muhammad Ali Barakat Al-Alaymat, a previously mentioned source, p. 80.

41Hazem Omar, *The Return of the State: The Evolution of the Political System in Egypt: Political Horizons*, Arab Center for Research and Studies, 2015, p. 135

42Rabih Muhammad al-Danan, Bassem Jalal al-Qasim: *Egypt between the eras of Morsi and al-Sisi, a comparative study*, Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, Beirut, 2016, p. 38

did not have in its previous era, starting with confronting the jihadists in the Sinai Peninsula, and providing the Egyptian army with intelligence information about the movements of the jihadists in Sinai and their whereabouts. And other information, as well as the employment of Israeli drones in collecting information and providing the Egyptian forces with it, and some confirm that when the Russian plane crashed in Sinai in the year 2015, Israel was the first to provide Egypt with information stating that the plane was shot down by a bomb, and all this in light of A clear security integration between Israel and Egypt in the military operations that Egypt was running on this island, and allowing the latter's army to bypass the provisions of the security annex in the Camp David Accords in order to improve its ability to confront jihadist movements in Sinai through Egyptian military mechanisms, if for the first time Egyptian warplanes are allowed jet"F-16 "launched raids in the regions of North Sinai with the aim of enabling the Egyptian army to strike the Islamic jihadist movements there ⁽⁴³⁾One of the manifestations of cooperation between Egypt and Israel during the Sisi era is the partnership in confronting the Palestinian resistance, specifically the Hamas movement, which crystallized in Egypt's destruction of hundreds of tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, which are the only outlet for the recovery of resistance movements, and the relentless attempts by the Israeli and Egyptian sides to overthrow the regime. Hamas and the preparation for a new Palestinian leadership that would be able to control matters after the overthrow of Hamas. The characteristics of the influence on Egyptian foreign policy by President Sisi reached its climax during the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip in July 2014, when the statement of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the start of the war ignored the nature of the targeted Israeli aggression in general. The head of the Palestinian civilians, his use of the term war actions instead of aggression, and holding the resistance in Palestine part of the responsibility for the outbreak of war ⁽⁴⁴⁾.

Second: The Egyptian-Israeli political and economic cooperation during the era of President Al-Sisi:

President Al-Sisi, since assuming power in his country, sought to create an environment that would allow the Israeli government, "especially the former Netanyahu government," to get rid of international proposals to find solutions to the Palestinian issue that those governments rejected, including withdrawal from the West Bank. The Americans revealed, on more than one occasion, secret meetings. President Sisi gathered with Netanyahu, the King of Jordan and the Secretary of State of the United States, in the Jordanian city of Aqaba in March 2016, and that the latter presented an initiative to settle the Palestinian issue based on the Arab Peace Initiative, and had the support of Sisi and King Abdullah, and was based on Arab recognition of the Jewishness of Israel ⁴⁵.

Based on the Egyptian Foreign Ministry's denial of such recent news, however, the relationship between Israel and Sisi has developed to the point of agreeing to develop a unified strategy and form joint work teams to coordinate the policies of the two parties towards the changes in the

43 Agdemir, A. Murat. "The Arab Spring and Israel's Relations with Egypt: A View from Turkey." *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 2016 p 223

(44) Osama Abu Nahl, Positions on the Israeli Aggression on the Gaza Strip, An Analytical Political Vision, Egypt and Turkey as a Model, Regional Positions on the Israeli Aggression on the Gaza Strip (2008, 2014) A working paper presented to the conference "Thematic Transformations in the Palestinian Issue after Oslo", Faculty of Arts, The Islamic University, Gaza, 2016, p. 2 and beyond.

45Haaretz, the leaders of Egypt, Israel and Jordan met secretly in Aqaba a year ago: Channelbbc published on the website:<https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-39021972>

region, especially the direction of "radical Islam" or some issues of common destiny, especially hostility to Turkey, which resulted in the formation of a new axis that includes, in addition to Egypt and Israel, Greece and Cyprus ⁴⁶.

The mutual diplomatic relations between the two parties constituted another manifestation of influence in the foreign context of Egypt towards Israel. Diplomatic relations were greatly strengthened during the era of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, which included the appointment of a new Egyptian ambassador in Tel Aviv, and allowing the Israeli embassy in Cairo unprecedented freedom of movement. Whether by meeting Egyptian civil society organizations or Egyptian human rights organizations, and holding meetings with businessmen and representatives of the Copts⁴⁷.

Another sign of warming relations was Egyptian President Sisi sending his foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry, to the Negev Summit in March 2022 where he joined his counterparts from Israel, Morocco, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.⁴⁸ After that, Egypt and Israel discussed ways to expand economic and trade relations in 2021, as the volume of bilateral trade between Egypt and Israel reached (330) million dollars annually, an increase of (63%) over 2020.

Israeli Minister of Economy and Industry Orna Barbevi said the new measures would help double bilateral trade to \$700 million within three years. The two countries are looking for ways to increase export capacity under the Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) protocol. The program, created by the United States in 2005, allows products manufactured jointly by Egypt and Israel to enter duty-free into the United States, provided they represent Israeli components (11.7% (of these products)⁴⁹).

There are (1,124) companies registered under the QIZ protocol as of February 2022, the vast majority of which produce textiles (80%). Exports under the Qualified Industrial Zones Protocol amounted to (1.2) billion dollars in 2021 and constituted (37%) of Egypt's total exports to the United States, in addition to ensuring that Sisi provides the appropriate environment in order to maintain respect for the Camp David Agreement, which carries with it economic importance Great for Israel, preventing the latter from returning to the disastrous economic situation after the 1973 war, ensuring Israel's supply of Egyptian gas, and eliminating Israel's anxiety over Turkey stopping the flow of Israeli gas to Europe after Israel signed an agreement with Turkey that includes exporting Israeli gas to Europe via Turkey.⁵⁰

Conclusion:

To sum up the foregoing, the researcher believes that the changing leadership of the Arab Republic of Egypt had the greatest impact on the change that ravaged the foreign policy of this Arab country, thus turning it against the tin of international relations, especially the regional ones. This variable, and what most preoccupied the fuse of this change towards these countries is the ideological factor

(46) Raneem Ali Gamal El-Din Al-Ghannam, International and Regional Conflicts over Natural Gas in the Middle East Region, 2009, 2019, Scientific Journal of the Faculty of Economic Studies, Volume 7, Number 14, Faculty of Economic Studies and Political Science, University of Alexandria, 2022, p. 570

47Rabih Muhammad al-Danan, Basem Jalal al-Qasim: Egypt between the eras of Morsi and al-Sisi, a previously mentioned source, pg. 44

(48) Rakha Ahmed Hassan, Sixth Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Negev: Al-Shorouk Magazine, article dated April 5, 2022, published on the website: Date of Visit<https://www.shorouknews.com>

49Haitham Hassanein, The Growing Economic Cooperation between Egypt and Israel, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, published on the website:<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org>

(50) Muhammad Ali Barakat Al-Aleimat, The Impact of the Arab Spring Revolutions on Israeli Relations, *ibid.*, p. 88

enjoyed by the leaders of these countries as well as their strategic interests in the region and the world at large, so it was not surprising that the course of Egyptian foreign policy in its relations with these countries turned into new grants that delineate its borders. In a completely different way than it was before the occurrence of that leadership change.

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